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Abstract
We study how the skill distribution in an economy responds to changes in wage gaps
induced by trade integration. Using administrative data for Denmark (1993–2012), we
conduct a two-step empirical analysis. In the first step, we predict changes in wage
gaps that are triggered by exogenous trade shocks. In the second step, we estimate the
impact of such changes on the skill distribution. The main results for Denmark show
that both the average and the standard deviation of skills increase as a result of trade
integration. We then extend our analysis to Portugal, using its administrative data
(1993–2012), to shed light on the potential role the labor market and education policy
may play in establishing the feedback effect of trade on the skill distribution. Finally,
we provide a theoretical intuition to rationalize both sets of results.
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1 Introduction
The hollowing-out of the middle class is a recent phenomenon, according to which mid-level
jobs are disappearing (employment polarization) and wage inequality is increasing (wage po-
larization). Recent literature documents employment and or wage polarization for developed
economies, such as Goos and Manning (2007) for the UK, Goos et al. (2009) in the context of
European economies, and Autor et al. (2003, 2006) for the US. Various theories posit differ-
ent main drivers of this polarization phenomenon such as skill-biased technological changes
(SBTC), routine-biased technological changes (RBTC), and the off-shoring of production
tasks.1 What weaves these theories into a common theme is that polarization stems from
exogenous demand shocks, such as those resulting from trade integration, that increase the
relative demand for a particular type of labor. These existing theories assume that the skill
supply is inelastic; however, this assumption is only plausible in a static environment and not
inconsequential in a dynamic one. For example, using the “supply side” of skills, Acemoglu
(2003) explains that when the supply of skills can respond to changing demand for skills,
the economy will select a different point along the relative demand curves.
Similar to Acemoglu (2003), we are also interested in the changing supply of skills in
response to exogenous shocks. However, unlike Acemoglu (2003) we study how adjustments
in the supply side of skills can lead to a different type of polarization which we call “skill
polarization”. This type of polarization highlights that the skill distribution changes in
response to exogenous shocks such that it becomes polarized and mid-level skills begin to
disappear. In part, the assumption of an inelastic supply of skills in the prior literature is
rationalized by the idea that the acquisition of skills is a slow process and that, therefore,
the skill distribution remains unchanged. One implication of this is that in the short-run
any exogenous shock affecting the relative demand of skills causes a pure price effect cap-
tured by changes in the relative wages of skills. Whereas this assumption is plausible in the
short-run, in a dynamic context the supply of skills is not necessarily inelastic. For example,
many state-led programs in industrialized countries allocate between 0.11 to 1 percent of
national GDP (Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program) to actively implement skill upgrad-
1For a review, see Katz and Autor (1999a). SBTC-based explanations posit that the demand for certain
skills has increased over time primarily due to SBTC that complements only a sub-group of skills, which
results in employment polarization. Moreover, Violante (2008) suggests that trade is an important determi-
nant of not only the speed but also the direction of SBTC. RBTC a` la Goos and Manning (2007) suggests
that recent technical changes are biased toward replacing routine tasks, which causes job polarization. Gross-
man and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) highlight that the off-shoring of tasks offers an explanation of the observed
changes in relative factor demands in response to trade.
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ing opportunities2, especially in response to trade shocks.3 In light of these policy efforts,
the adjustments in the skill supply can affect the whole skill distribution. In this paper we
explore whether trade-induced exogenous changes to the relative prices of skills, i.e., wage
gap shocks, can cause the hollowing-out of mid-level skills.
We adopt a systematic approach by answering three related questions: First, what impact
do exogenous demand shocks resulting from trade have on wage gaps across skills? Second,
what are the implications of exogenous changes in these wage gaps (induced by trade) for
the skill distribution, and do they contribute to skill polarization over time? Finally, is a
welfare state (such as Denmark) that promotes free education and a flexible labor market
more prone to skill polarization relative to other states (such as Portugal) that lack such
welfare policies and are characterized by rigid labor markets and less generous education
policies?
We study the first two questions in the Danish case by using its employer-employee
matched data because Denmark can be viewed as a context in which the skill supply responses
constitute an upper bound for the effect in question. Denmark is characterized by a flexible
labor market and is also a universalist welfare state that provides all of its citizens benefits
ranging from free access to education and vocational training to unemployment benefits. Our
hypothesis is that such domestic institutions should make the supply less inelastic in the long-
run and facilitate the adjustment of skill levels in response to trade-driven demand shocks.
To determine whether this is the case, we then extend our analysis by using Portuguese
employer-employee matched data as a comparison to study the role of domestic institutions
and answer our last research question.
The empirical analysis for each country is conducted in two steps. The first step is to
estimate the effect of exogenous trade shocks on two types of wage gaps (upper- and lower-
wage gaps), while controlling for other confounding factors. An upper-wage gap is defined as
the ratio of wages between the 90th and the median percentiles (a measure that proxies for
the wage gap associated with the right tail of worker skills), while a lower-wage gap is defined
as the ratio of wages between the median and the 10th percentiles (a measure that proxies
for the wage gap associated with the left tail of worker skills). We use the estimates from
this step to construct predicted changes in wage gaps due to trade (henceforth exogenous
trade-induced wage gap changes) – which are orthogonal to the skill distribution in the next
2Some examples include vocational training, short-term programs, online degrees, adjustment payments
and subsidies.
3The policy role is highlighted by Autor (2014), who writes, “· · · it is critical to underscore that policy
and governance has played and should continue to play a central role in shaping inequality even when a
central cause of rising inequality is the changing supply and demand for skills.”
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step. While the unit of analysis in our first step is at the industry level, making our analysis
comparable to the existing literature (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson, 2001), we aggregate the
trade-induced wage gap changes at the level of relatively self-contained local labor markets
(municipalities) in our second step.4 To do so, we use the weights based on the share of each
industry’s sales in the total sales in each municipality.5 In the second step, we assess how
the predicted trade-induced wage gap changes from the first step affect next period’s skill
distribution in these local labor markets – i.e., the average level and the variance of skills
within the municipality.6
Our empirical methodology is based on three key identification assumptions that are
motivated by the existing literature. First, the exogenous international trade shock is a pure
demand-shifter of skills (Katz and Autor, 1999b). Second, the supply of skills is assumed
inelastic in the short-run, and thus the contemporaneous trade shocks mainly affects wage
gaps (Acemoglu, 2003) rather than the skill supply. This is consistent with the notion that
acquiring skills requires time. Third, even though the skill supply is fixed in the short
run, in a dynamic context (medium-to-long run) it is not (Acemoglu, 2003). Under these
assumptions, an exogenous increase in trade activity can lead to changes in the wage gap
(due to changing demand of skills), which can affect individual’s incentives to upgrade or
maintain skill levels. These skill supply decisions at the individual level can translate into
subsequent changes of the skill distribution when aggregated at a macro level. Furthermore,
the responsiveness of skill distribution to exogenous shocks can depend on a country’s labor
market structure and institutional policies. We will shed light on this by comparing the
Danish and Portuguese economy.
Our main results for Denmark show that trade integration has a non-linear effect on
wage gaps across various skills and that such trade-induced wage gap changes significantly
influence the skill distribution. Specifically, we find that the exogenous changes in trade have
a negative effect on the lower-wage gap and a positive effect on the upper-wage gap. As a
result, the predicted changes in these wage gaps increase the mean and the variance of the
4Our results, discussed later, are also consistent when the second step is estimated at the industry level
(instead of municipality level). See the previous version of the paper (http://ftp.iza.org/dp10035.pdf).
5Note that our methodology is similar in spirit to Autor et al. (2013). While Autor et al. (2013) directly
use the trade shocks at the industry level with the relevant weights to construct a local labor market
exposure to trade, for the purpose of our study we first need to construct the exogenous trade-induced wage
gap changes at the industry level (which we do in our first step) and then use the weights to construct the
municipality-level exposure to these shocks (which we use in our second step).
6As in Foged and Peri (2016), the geographic units of analysis that we use to approximate local labor
markets are municipalities. Foged and Peri (2016) note that most worker mobility is observed across firms
within a municipality, confirming that municipalities, even in the long run, are rather self-contained labor
markets. Our study is similar in spirit to the strand of the trade literature that investigates the impact of
trade shocks on local labor markets (Autor et al., 2013; Li, 2016).
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skill distribution, resulting in skill polarization. In contrast, for Portugal, we find that the
exogenous changes in trade have a positive impact on both measures of wage gaps but that
their impacts on the first two moments of the skill distribution are negligible. Therefore,
our main results show that changes in trade-induced wage gaps improve the average level of
skills but also make the skills more diverse in welfare states with flexible labor markets, such
as those in Denmark, while the effects are less pronounced in frictional labor markets, such
as those in Portugal.
To rationalize our empirical results from the second step of the analysis, we present
a simple three-period, partial equilibrium setting, with agents that are heterogeneous in
their innate abilities, to highlight how exogenous changes in wage gaps affect an individual’s
incentives to upgrade skills and how such individual-level decisions, when aggregated, affect
the skill distribution. We also extend this framework to encompass the role of institutions
by introducing labor market frictions. We then show that such frictions can mitigate the
responsiveness of the skill distribution to exogenous changes in the wage gaps.
We make three main contributions to the literature. First, we study the effect of exoge-
nous trade shocks on the changes in the wage gaps. At present, there is no consensus in
the empirical literature on what effect globalization has on wage gaps. On the one hand,
Feenstra and Hanson (2001) argue that the increased importation of intermediate products
instead of final products can explain between 15 and 24 percent of the increased ratio of
skilled to unskilled workers’ wages. In contrast, Lawrence (2008) concludes that although
increasing trade with developing countries may have contributed to growing wage dispersion
over the 1995–2005 period, the impact seems to be small. On the other hand, Krugman
(2008) argues that the difficulty of concluding what impact trade has had on wage gaps
might be due to a lack of appropriate data. We contribute to this literature by estimating
the effect of trade on wage gaps in Denmark and Portugal.
Our second contribution is studying how the distribution of skills responds to exogenous
trade-induced wage gaps, which is sorely missing from the existing literature. In traditional
trade models, the cross-country differences in average skill levels are typically assumed to
be exogenous and, in turn, determine the patterns of trade. Bombardini et al. (2012) note
that the cross-country differences in the diversity of skills are an important determinant of
trade patterns in addition to average skill levels. Hence, most of the previous literature on
trade assumes that the skill distribution (here, average and variance) is an exogenous driver
of trade. Such an assumption is appealing and appropriate in a the short-run but highly
restrictive for dynamic time-series analyses (see Acemoglu, 2003).
Although several papers (Danziger, 2017; Davidson and Sly, 2014) investigate how skill
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acquisition responds to trade shocks, a few studies address how the skill distribution changes
accordingly. For example, Atkin (2012) studies how the onset of NAFTA, which resulted in
new jobs in the Mexican manufacturing sector, affected the drop-out rates of students living
in municipalities that were more exposed to trade shocks. Another important contribution
in this context is from Blanchard and Olney (2017). They empirically find that educational
attainment is affected by exogenously driven changes in the composition of a country’s
exports, and thus, they offer insights into how investment in human capital evolves with
changing patterns of trade. Compared with these studies, we make an important contribution
by studying the feedback effect of trade on the skill distribution by exploring how trade
impacts not only the average levels of skills but also the diversity of skills. Therefore, we can
study the issue of trade-induced skill polarization, which the aforementioned papers and the
previous literature in this field have not fully explored.
Our last contribution is that we explore whether domestic education policies and labor
market institutions interact with the effect of trade-induced wage gaps on the skill distribu-
tion. The existing literature alludes to the potential role that education and labor market
policies can play in facilitating the adjustment of the skill composition to globalization.
However, there are no analyses comparing the impact of trade on the skill distribution in
economies such as Denmark, where the labor market is flexible and education policies are
generous, and in economies such as Portugal, where education policies are less generous and
the labor market is more frictional (Botero et al., 2004).
In Section 2, we present the institutional background for Denmark. Data and summary
statistics are then discussed in Section 3. Our empirical strategy is explained in Section 4.
We present our baseline results, additional robustness analyses and the comparison between
Denmark and Portugal’s results in Section 5. In Section 6, we provide a framework to
rationalize our empirical results. We then conclude in Section 7. Proofs, figures, and tables
are collected in appendices at the end of the paper.
2 Institutional Background
In this section, we explain the main features that define the trade patterns, labor market,
and education policies in Denmark.
Denmark is a highly export-oriented economy. Traditionally, Danish trade has been lim-
ited to a few trading partners (in the 1990s approximately 10 countries, mostly EU members,
accounted for 70 percent of Danish trade). Denmark has recently also begun to trade with
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emerging economies, such as the BRICs, East Asian countries, and Eastern European coun-
tries. Figure 1 illustrates that export value has exhibited a very steep and positive trend with
respect to destination markets outside the developed world, such as China. Thus, despite
the maturity of the Danish economy, the process of trade integration was still evolving over
the period considered in our analysis. In terms of export composition, Denmark features
large export shares within machinery and equipment, textiles, food and transport (OECD,
2013).
Following from the long-standing tradition of open trade, globalization is generally seen
as a positive force in Denmark. Indeed, the flexibility of its labor market means that Den-
mark is in a better position than many other European countries to adapt to the changes
in global market conditions brought about by the emergence of low-cost producer countries.
Cornerstones of the Danish model are a high level of job to job mobility and generous social
security policies. The absence of severance payment lowers hiring and firing costs, reduces
matching frictions and makes it easier for firms to adjust the quality and size of their work-
force. Moreover, although workers are not protected by stringent employment rules, they
bear relatively low costs of changing employers and have easy access to unemployment or
social assistance benefits and activation programs. In fact, the replacement rate is among the
highest in the world (OECD, 2015). Another key feature of the Danish labor market is that
its wage bargaining has recently become much more decentralized. Since the early 1980s,
an increasing share of wage bargaining devolved to the individual-employee level, which
increased the relevance of the employer and employee’s role in the internal firm wage struc-
ture. As found in Eriksson and Westergaard-Nielsen (2009), within-firm wage variability in
Denmark represents more than 80 percent of the total variability observed among all workers.
The Danish government generally provides abundant subsidies for individuals to under-
take skill upgrading and education. Formal schooling is largely provided free at both the
secondary and tertiary levels, and a monthly income transfer, i.e., statens uddannelsesstøtte,
of approximately 700 dollars is provided to all Danish students during the entire course of
their undergraduate and master’s studies. Generous grants are also provided by the State
to finance most of adult education and continuing educational programs.7 As a result of
these policies, the education level of the workforce is very high by international standards.
In 2012, the population share having attained upper secondary education far exceeded the
OECD average. The share having attained tertiary education is also above the OECD aver-
7In 2005 expenditures for adult education amounted to a total of DKK 5 billion, of which DKK 2.7 billion
for educational activities and DKK 1.6 billion for special allowances (pub.uvm.dk/2007/lifelonglearning).
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age (OECD, 2013). Furthermore two out of three adult Danes participate in formal and/or
non-formal education. This participation rate is considerably above the average of 51 percent
across 22 OECD countries and is in fact the joint highest with Finland and Sweden (OECD,
2013).
Because of these generous education policies, combined with a flexible labor market with
limited matching frictions, the Danish workforce appears to be well equipped to adjust to
changes in the wage gaps induced by trade. Such responses are therefore more likely to be
reflected in changes in the distribution of skills, which is the subject of our study.
3 Data
Information about firms and workers is collected from three databases/registers at the Danish
official statistical institute (Denmark Statistics): the “Integrated Database for Labor Market
Research” (IDA), the “Accounting Statistics Registers” (FirmStat), and the “Foreign Trade
Statistics Register” (Udenrigshandelsstatistikken). From the population of all firms, we only
retain private firms that are included in all three databases over the period from 1993 to
2012. Moreover, we drop firms with only 1 employee to exclude self-employment. We now
provide further details about how we process the data in each database.
IDA is a longitudinal employer-employee register, containing information on the age,
gender, nationality, place of residence, work, education, labor market status, occupation,
and annual wage of each individual aged 15-74 between 1980 and 2012. The information is
updated once a year in week 48. Apart from deaths and permanent migration, there is no
attrition in the data. From this register, we only keep individuals who are employed full
time every year in the period from 1993 to 2012. The individual information in IDA is used
to estimate our individual skill measure, which will be explained in the next section. Then,
we use the individual skill measure to calculate the first two moments of skill distribution for
each Danish municipality, for the purpose of our empirical analysis. Individual-level variables
in IDA are also used to measure a number of workforce characteristics at the municipality
level: the share of workers with secondary and post-secondary education; the percentage of
male employees; and the average age and work experience. Because we can track people
throughout the study period, we can also establish the average tenure of all employees. To
address outliers, the top and bottom 1 percent of wage earners in each year are excluded.
Our second database is Firm Statistics Register (FirmStat henceforth), which covers the
universe of private-sector firms over the years 1993-2012. It provides the annual value of
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capital stock, firm productivity and industry affiliation.8 We also aggregate the firm-level
data at the 4-digit level classification of the Danish Industrial Activities.9
The last database that we use is the Foreign Trade Statistics Register. It contains data
on export (and import) sales and the number of exported products at the firm level for
the same period as FirmStat. This data are available both by specific destination and at
an aggregated level. Exports are recorded in Danish kroner (DKK) according to the 8-
digit Combined Nomenclature as long as the transaction is worth at least 7500 DKK or
involves goods that weigh at least 1000 kg.10 To construct our instruments, as explained
in the next section, we aggregate these flows at the 4-digit level and merge them with the
U.N. COMTRADE data.11 Moreover, as we did for all the other variables included in the
empirical analysis, we calculate export (and import) sales at the 4-digit level classification
of the Danish Industrial Activities.12
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our main variables for our sample period of
1993–2012. The first row reports the cross-industry average ratio between the 90th and 50th
percentiles of the within-industry wage distribution (denoted by ∆2), whereas the second
row reports the cross-industry average ratio between the 50th and 10th percentiles of the
within-industry wage distribution (denoted by ∆1). Assuming that wages are monotonic in
8Capital stock comprises the sum of the values (in Danish kroner) of land, buildings, machines, equip-
ment and inventory. Firm productivity, which is the most important predictor of a firm’s export behavior,
according to recent trade theory, is calculated as turnover per employee in logarithmic scale (i.e., labor
productivity). We deflate all monetary values using the World Bank’s GDP deflator with 2005 as the base
year.
9Consistent with the literature on the “servization of manufacturing” (Bernard et al., 2017; Bernard and
Fort, 2015) we find in our sample period a substantial number of non-retail firms that report their core activity
being in services despite simultaneously trading goods (approximately 1,500, on average, over the sample
period or, equivalently, approximately 7 percent of all exporting firms). Most of these firms are companies
that no longer undertake goods production but are still involved in design, R&D and engineering processes,
the supervision of third-party production and branding, marketing and distribution. These businesses have
many of the same capabilities and activities as traditional manufacturing firms but no longer directly control
the assembly and processing activities in-house. As we will discuss later in the robustness checks section,
our main results do not change when we exclude those firms (and the industries in which they operate) from
the sample and focus our analysis on the manufacturing sector only.
107500 DKK is equivalent to approximately 1000 euros at the time of writing. Since the introduction of
the euro, the Danish Central Bank has adopted a fixed exchange rate policy vis-a-vis the euro.
11The first 6-digits of the Combined Nomenclature in the Foreign Trade Statistics Register are the same as
the product classification in the COMTRADE data, i.e., the HS classification. However, we use the 4-digit
level aggregation to considerably improve consistency over time.
12We map international export and import data at the 6-digit product level to the 4-digit industry level by
merging the Foreign Trade Statistics Register with FirmStat, where for each firm, we observe the industry
code.
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skills (Blanchard and Willmann, 2016), we can interpret ∆2 as the wage gap associated with
the upper skill levels and ∆1 as the wage gap for the lower skill levels. In other words, ∆2
is a proxy for the return on the highest skills relative to median skills and ∆1 is the proxy
for the return on median skills relative to the lowest skills.
An important observation is that the wage gap for the higher skills is smaller than the
wage gap for the lower skills (∆1 > ∆2). This is in line with the decreasing marginal return to
skills. As skills increase, wages increase but at a decreasing rate. We also plot the evolution
of ∆1 and ∆2 over time in the first panel of Figure 2. It shows that ∆2 (in the range of 1.5)
is indeed always smaller than ∆1 (in the range of 1.8). In addition, the wage gap for the
higher skills is increasing over time, while the wage gap for lower skills exhibits a negative
trend.
Our measure of trade activity in the main analysis is based on overall export value,
although in a robustness check, we also consider import value. In an additional specification,
we also make a distinction between exports to developed (north) and developing (south)
countries. Table 1 reveals that Denmark has a higher value of exports to northern than to
southern countries, which is consistent with the notion that most Danish trade is within the
EU. On average, Denmark also has a larger import than export value.
In the empirical analysis, we also consider a number of industry-level characteristics. The
main descriptive statistics for those characteristics are also reported in Table 1. Specifically,
these control variables include average firm capital intensity and average firm productivity
as proxies for industry technology, the average share of male or foreign workers, and a host
of workforce composition characteristics.
Our main skill variable is a multidimensional index drawn from Portela (2001) (definition
1), which is based on the interaction of years of education, experience and unobserved ability,
as explained in the next section. We also conduct empirical analyses using five additional
measures of skills. The first alternative is based on years of education only (definition 2).
The next three measures (definitions 3-5) are all estimated from the additive “two-way”
worker-firm effects model (Abowd et al., 1999), as explained in the robustness check section.
These variables represent a host of proxies for workers’ skills acquired formally at school and
informally in the labor market. Since the additive model requires additional assumptions
that may be restrictive, we also provide the results when using a skill measure based on a
job-spell fixed effects model (definition 6).
The second panel of Figure 2 reports the developments of the first two moments of skills
over time, where skills are measured using definition 1. It shows that both the average and
standard deviation of skills have been increasing steeply for Denmark. Similar patterns are
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observed if we consider the other definitions of skills.
4 Methodology
Two challenges complicate our effort to empirically study our research questions. First,
individuals’ skill, our variable of interest, is generally very difficult to measure. Second,
reverse causality between our measures of wage gaps, trade, and skill distribution could
pose a threat to identification. We organize this section into two parts highlighting how we
address the aforementioned challenges. The first part describes our measure of skills. The
second part discusses our two-step empirical strategy to study the effect of trade on wage
gaps and how such trade-induced wage gap changes affect the distribution of skills, i.e., the
mean (average) and variance (diversity) of skills.
4.1 Skill Measures
Our baseline skill measure is drawn from Portela (2001) and is a multidimensional index
of workers’ human capital. Specifically, this index is constructed at the worker level by
combining information on employees’ years of education, work experience, and unobserved
ability as follows:
skillit = mschoolt ×
(
0.5 +
e(schoolit−mschoolt)/sschoolt
1 + e(schoolit−mschoolt)/sschoolt
)
×
(
0.5 +
e(expit−mexpt)/sexpt
1 + e(expit−mexpt)/sexpt
|schoolit
)
×
(
0.5 +
e(effectit−meffectt)/seffectt
1 + e(effectit−meffectt)/seffectt
|schoolit, expit
)
where i is the index for individual workers, t is for year, e is natural exponential function.
schoolit, expit, and effectit are the years of education, work experience, and unobserved
ability for worker i at year t, respectively. The variables mschoolt, mexpt, and meffectt
are the mean of workers’ years of education, work experience, and unobserved ability at
year t in the economy, respectively, and sschoolt, sexpt, and seffectt are the corresponding
standard deviations. Note that unobserved ability is measured by the individual fixed effects
estimated from gender-specific wage equations, in which we control for workers’ education,
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age, experience, tenure, their squares, and firm fixed effects (Abowd et al., 1999).13
The skill measure, skillit, is measured in the following way according to the above equa-
tion. We first assume that all workers start off with the average level of education in the
economy, mschoolt. This average is then adjusted by (0.5 +
e(schoolit−mschoolt)/sschoolt
1+e(schoolit−mschoolt)/sschoolt ) to take
into account worker i’s ranking in the distribution of schooling received by all workers in
the economy. This correction is computed using the cumulative logistic distribution. The
second adjustment to worker i’s skill measure is her work experience conditional on her edu-
cation. That is, we consider worker i’s relative position in the distribution of work experience
only among individuals with the same education level. This correction reflects the fact that
individuals with the same education level may have different skills as a result of different
work experiences. Finally, we use a similar procedure to correct for worker i’s unobserved
ability conditional on schooling and work experience. These three adjustments allow us to
measure the skills for worker i at year t, skillit, which we later use to calculate the average
and standard deviation of skills at the year-municipality level.
To understand our baseline measure of individual skills, first notice that each adjustment
can range from 0.5 to 1.5. An adjustment greater than 1 depicts above-average schooling,
work experience, or ability, and vice versa. Conditioning on schooling allows us to adjust
the skill measure with experience and ability. For instance, imagine two individuals: i) one
who acquired a Ph.D. in 6 years; ii) another one who took 4 years for the same degree and
gained 2 years of work experience after graduation. If we simply use their education level as
a skill measure, then the two individuals will appear to have exactly the same skill level. Our
experience-adjusted skill measure, however, discounts the first individual’s skills for the lack
of work experience. Therefore, the statistical moments of our skill measure will likely capture
the municipality’s skill distribution better than those based on education only. Nevertheless
we will also provide the main results by using among others a skill measure based on years
of education in the robustness checks.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
We now present our empirical strategy in two steps. Specifically, we answer two main
questions here: First, what is the impact of exogenous demand shocks due to trade on wage
gaps over time? Second, what implications do such demand shocks affecting wages have for
the skill distribution? In the first step, we first estimate the trade shocks’ impact on wage
gaps at the industry level, and then use relevant weights to construct the local labor market
13See section 5.2.2 below for more details on this econometric model.
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exposure to trade-induced wage gap changes (which we use as our exogenous shock in the
second step). This is similar to the approach of Autor et al. (2013), who construct exogenous
trade shocks at the industry level and aggregate the shocks at the local labor market level
using the relevant weights to construct the local labor market exposure to trade shocks. In
the second step, we estimate the impact of the above wage gap changes on the local labor
market skill distribution.
We prefer the two-step empirical approach for three reasons. First, under the identifica-
tion assumptions detailed in the introduction, exogenous trade shocks can affect wage gaps
in the short run through skill demand changes, but the resulting wage-gap changes cannot
affect the skill supply in the short run because the skill supply is inelastic. However, the
wage-gap changes can affect the skill supply in a dynamic context in a longer time hori-
zon (Acemoglu, 2003). Two-step regressions allow us to distinguish between the timing of
trade-induced wage-gap changes and the subsequent skill supply adjustments. Second, the
two-step strategy allows us to identify a rather unexplored channel (i.e.; the one of wage-gap
changes) through which trade can affect the skill distribution. This helps us to interpret and
theorize our empirical results. Third, the first step itself addresses an interesting question,
i.e., to what extent the demand shocks from trade can affect wage gaps. It also allows us to
compare our results from the first step with those of existing papers.14
4.2.1 The First Step: The Impact of Trade on Wage Gaps
For the first step, we use the following industry-level specification:
∆jt = α + β
′
Xjt + γtradejt + δj + δt + jt (1)
where the dependent variable is wage gaps and can take one of two measures. One is the
ratio of the 50th to the 10th percentile of the wage distribution (
w50jt
w10jt
= ∆1jt) at industry
level j at year t, as a proxy for the medium-to-low-skill wage gap (i.e., lower wage gap). The
other is the ratio of the 90th to the 50th percentile of the wage distribution (
w90jt
w50jt
= ∆2jt)
at industry level j at year t, as a proxy for the high-to-medium-skill wage gap (i.e., upper
wage gap). Hence, we run two separate regressions for the upper wage gaps and the lower
wage gaps, as we intend to examine the possible differential impact of trade on two types of
wage gaps. The variable tradejt is total export value for industry j at year t.
15
14For instance, Acemoglu (2003) exploit differences in demand shocks induced by trade as one of the
possible explanations to cross-country differences in skill premia.
15In an alternative specification implemented in the robustness checks section, we measure the industry-
level export value separately for “north” and “south” destinations. “North” includes countries in North
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The vector Xjt includes productivity (measured as sales per employee), capital intensity,
and workforce composition characteristics (such as the shares of college-educated, foreign-
born, or male workers, as well as workers’ average age), for each industry j at year t.
The above specifications are completed with a full set of industry fixed effects, denoted by
δj, and time fixed effects, denoted by δt. Most of these control variables are motivated
by the technology- and trade-augmented model of labor demand and supply developed by
Katz and Murphy (1992), as in our empirical specification both the supply and demand of
labor may change because of non-trade factors. More specifically, the variables of industry
productivity, capital intensity, and time trends control for the effect of SBTC and labor
demand changes, while the variables of workforce composition characteristics control for
labor supply changes.16 Furthermore, by including the share of foreign workers in Xjt, we also
control for the impact of immigration on our measures of wage gaps. Finally, productivity,
capital intensity, and industry dummies also help us control for the effects due to industry
size.
One possible threat to the identification of γ is that the variable tradejt is likely to
be endogenous in regression (1). To obtain an unbiased estimate of the parameter γ, we
instrument the export value variable with exogenous trade shocks at the industry level in
a 2SLS estimation. Exogenous trade shocks are constructed first by calculating changes in
the world import demand for each product using U.N. COMTRADE data following the IV
approach employed in Hummels et al. (2014) and then aggregating the product-level world
import demand changes to the 4-digit level of Danish industry classification. We denote our
IV as mjt. Specifically, the instrument is constructed jointly for total exports as follows:
mjt =
C∑
c=1
P∑
p=1
expjcp baseyear
expj baseyear
Icpt (2)
where Icpt is each country c’s total purchases of product p from the world market (less
America, Oceania, and Western and Southern Europe (excluding the new EU members of the 2004 enlarge-
ment). All other countries in the world are considered in the category “south.” In addition, we also use
import value instead of export value as an alternative measure.
16For instance, if technological change follows a linear trend, then the effect of SBTC will be absorbed
by our time fixed effects. However, if technology disproportionately changes the productivity of high-skilled
workers over time, then such effects should be captured by industry productivity. Moreover, the role of
machinery in providing better technology, which favors skilled workers, should be captured by controlling
for industry-level capital intensity. In our robustness checks, we also use expenditures on research and
development (R& D) at the industry level relative to total expenditures to divide the sample into high- and
low-tech industries. Examining the low-tech industries in isolation will help us to further separate the impact
of SBTC from that of trade.
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purchases from Denmark) at time t (Hummels et al., 2014). They are exogenous to Denmark
and vary across countries and products. The variable expjcp baseyear represents industry j’s
export value of product p to destination c in the base year (which is 1993 in our case), and
expj baseyear denotes the world total export value in each industry j. The weights,
expjcp baseyear
expj baseyear
,
are the base-year (1993) export shares, which are constant and industry-specific. Hence,
they are exogenous to changes in the level or type of technology over time that might affect
both exports and wage gaps at the industry level. Overall, mjt is not endogenous with the
dependent variable, Danish wage gaps.
The results from regression (1) allow us to establish the overall impact of trade on
wage gaps within Danish industries. To further explore whether Denmark’s trade with
different destinations is driving the result, in an additional analysis, we predict the impact
of export value for different export destinations on our measures of wage gaps, i.e., trading
with northern or southern countries (Costinot and Vogel, 2010). We can then interpret the
overall effect of trade on the wage gap, γ, as a combination of effects from trading with both
types of countries.
4.2.2 The Second Step: The Impact on the Skill Distribution
In the second step, we estimate the impact of exogenous trade-induced wage-gap changes
on the skill distribution at the municipality level.17 We use the predicted wage gap changes
at the industry level from Equation 1, i.e., changes in the wage gap due to the exogenous
trade shocks, to calculate the average wage gap changes weighted by industry shares for each
municipality m. The industry weights are constructed as the share of each industry’s sales in
the total sales at the municipality level. Then, to quantify the impact on skill distribution,
we examine the first two moments of individual skills at each municipality: the average
individual skill level at municipality m, denoted by ¯skillmt, and the standard deviation of
skills, denoted by σ(skillmt). The latter can also be regarded as a measure of skill diversity.
We estimate the following specifications at the municipality level18:
¯skillmt = α + β ¯skillmt−1 + γ
′
Xmt−1 + δave ˆ∆mt−1 + ηm + ηt + mt (3)
σ(skillmt) = α + βσ(skillmt−1) + γ
′
Xmt−1 + δdisp ˆ∆mt−1 + ηm + ηt + mt (4)
17We use the municipality in which a firm is located as a reference point.
18As in Foged and Peri (2016), we consider the broad municipality definition that combines several of the
old municipalities as local labor markets.
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where the first two moments of the skill distribution at municipality m are based on the skill
variable described in the Section 4.1. The key explanatory variable ( ˆ∆mt−1) is calculated
as the weighted average of γiv ˆtradejt−1, with γiv estimated from Equation (1) using the IV
approach. Due to collinearity issues, we cannot include predicted changes in the lower wage
gap, ∆1,mt−1, and the upper wage gap, ∆2,mt−1, at the same time in a regression; we have to
include them separately. Furthermore, the wage gaps ˆ∆mt−1 are lagged consistently with our
identification assumption according to which skill distribution changes take time and cannot
happen simultaneously with current trade-induced wage-gap changes. In the baseline, we lag
the wage gap variable by one year (as the results reported in Section 5.1). In the robustness
checks, we also lag it by either two or three years (see Section 5.2.5).
The vector of industry characteristics in weighted averages at the municipality level
(Xmt−1) is also lagged by one year to attenuate simultaneity issues; it includes productivity,
capital intensity, average workers’ age, and the shares of male and foreign-born workers.
These variables, again, control for skill distribution changes due for example to SBTC, and
immigration. Finally, we include both municipality fixed effects, ηm, and time fixed effects,
ηt. Since the first two moments of the skill distribution are stock variables, we also include
the lagged value of the dependent variable to control for autocorrelation. We estimate
Equations (3) and (4) by using the system GMM estimator suggested by Blundell and Bond
(1998), in which all the explanatory variables described above except the year fixed effects
are considered endogenous.19 The standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and
sequentially bootstrapped with Equation 1. Finally, the coefficients in Equations 3 and 4
are weighted by the number of employed individuals at the municipality level, as in Foged
and Peri (2016).
5 Results
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, the wage gap associated with the
medium-to-low (high-to-medium) skills is negatively (positively) affected by trade. Second,
an increase in different types of wage gaps has different effects on the distribution of skills:
(1) An increase in medium-to-low wage gap results in lower average skills and a more homo-
geneous skill distribution; (2) an increase in the high-to-medium wage gap results in higher
average skills and a more heterogeneous skill distribution. Interpreting our results from the
first and second steps allows us to conclude that trade integration increases the overall mean
19We restrict the number of instruments of the endogenous variables by setting the maximum lag to 5
periods. Moreover, the year dummies are only to be considered as instruments in the level equations.
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and standard deviation of the skill distribution in Denmark. The increased variation of the
skill distribution suggests skill polarization.
In the following section, we first discuss in detail the baseline results and then present
a host of robustness checks that allow us to corroborate our main findings. We then extend
the analysis to Portugal to investigate whether our findings of the impact of trade on the
skill distribution also apply in a context characterized by a highly regulated labor market
and less generous education policies compared to the Danish case. This comparison allows
us to shed light on the interaction between domestic institutions and international trade in
influencing the skill distribution.
5.1 Baseline Results
The estimated coefficients from the first and second steps of our econometric specification
are presented in the first and second panels of Table 2, respectively. The results from our
first step show that an increase in trade value causes the wage gap for high-to-medium-skill
workers (∆2) to increase and the wage gap for medium-to-low-skill workers (∆1) to decrease.
Specifically, the first panel of the table shows that a one-standard-deviation increase in the
export value causes an approximately 1 (8) percent increase (decrease) in ∆2 (∆1). These
numbers are obtained by using the averages of w90
w50
(i.e., ∆2) and
w50
w10
(i.e., ∆1) and the
standard deviation of the log of the export value from Table 1.
The results from our second step show that the effect of the trade-induced wage gap
on the skill distribution in the local labor market is significant. In particular, the second
panel of the table shows that a one-standard-deviation increase in the predicted wage gap ∆ˆ2
(∆ˆ1) leads to a 27 percent increase (3 percent decrease) in the mean of skills and a 77 (15)
percent increase (decrease) in the standard deviation of skill, when we estimate the second
step with standard OLS.20 We obtain more conservative results if we estimate the second
step by using the system GMM estimator, which treats the main explanatory variables in
equations 3-4 as endogenous. According to the results reported in the third panel of Table 2,
a one-standard-deviation increase in the predicted wage gap, ∆ˆ2 (∆ˆ1), leads to a 15 percent
increase (2 percent decrease) in the mean of skills and a 25 (5) percent increase (decrease)
in the standard deviation of skill.
Combining the findings from the first and second steps reveals that changes in the wage
gaps due to trade (∆1 and ∆2) have a uni-directional effect on the skill distribution in the
20These numbers are obtained by using the averages of the mean and standard deviation of skills and by
increasing ∆ˆ2 and ∆ˆ1 by one standard deviation.
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local labor market. In particular, since the predicted ∆1 decreases and ∆2 increases, they
together cause the average and variance of skills to increase. As a result, the Danish skill
distribution shifts to the right and becomes more dispersed. Moreover, qualitatively similar
results [not presented in the paper for brevity but available in a previous version of this
study21] are obtained if we estimate the second step at an industry level (instead of using
municipality as the unit of analysis). This suggests that our reported effects are on average
consistent across industries. Additionally, our results are confirmed by running a simple
one-step model, in which we estimate the direct impact of our export shocks on the the two
moments of the skill distribution.22
We rationalize these results using a simple conceptual framework, which is presented
more formally in Section 6. Here, briefly, the intuition is that while a decrease in ∆1 reduces
the marginal return for the low-skill population to acquire medium skills, it also reduces the
marginal cost (in terms of the opportunity cost of losing current wages while upgrading skills)
for the medium-skill workers to acquire higher skills. Moreover, an increase in ∆2 further
increases the return for the medium-skill population to acquire higher skills, without affecting
the low-skill population. Therefore, overall, the lower-skill population is discouraged from
upgrading skills, while the medium skill population is encouraged to upgrade their skills.
The above induces higher average skill levels, if the proportion of upgraders dominates the
proportion of discouraged workers. In addition, skills in both tails become more abundant
than before, resulting in skill polarization, i.e., the variance in skills increases.
A recent paper by Keller and Utar (2016) also contributes to this line of work by using
Danish data and complements our work from two aspects.23 First, their paper’s analysis
focuses on job polarization due to import competition from China and the change of demand
for jobs with different wage levels. Our paper, by contrast, highlights skill polarization due to
both export and import (see section 5.2.3) shocks, which are not only limited to China, and
the adjustment of skill supply. The skill polarization highlighted in our paper is especially
relevant for European economies that are suffering from a hollowing-out of mid-level skills.
While the popular press typically suggests an aging population as the explanation for this
phenomenon, our paper provides a new explanation for this recent polarization causing the
vanishing of mid-level skills (Business Insider, 2016).24 Second, our study supplements the
21http://ftp.iza.org/dp10035.pdf
22Specifically we estimate Equations (3) and (4) with a system GMM approach by replacing the predicted
wage gap variables with the instrument mjt−1. In this one-step specification, the estimated coefficients on
the export shocks are both positive and statistically significant.
23Using a different empirical specification, Keller and Utar (2016) show that import competition from
China explains both the decrease in middle-wage and the increase in low- and high-wage employment in
Denmark during the period 1999–2009, which is in line with our findings.
24http://nordic.businessinsider.com/sweden-and-denmark-have-daunting-skills-gaps—and-risk-losing-
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main results for Denmark by considering the experience of Portugal, another small open
economy with a completely different institutional framework over the same period of time.
This comparison helps us to shed light on the role of institutions and educational policies in
affecting the impact of trade on skill distribution.
5.2 Robustness Checks
5.2.1 Alternative Mechanisms
We interpret our baseline findings as trade-induced wage gap changes affecting the incentives
to upgrade skills such that the skill distribution becomes more polarized. However, the
changes in the skill distribution we observed in our baseline results may also be due to two
alternative mechanisms such as migration between municipalities or inflows and outflows
from the labor market.
First, changes in the wage gap (due to trade shocks) may encourage skill-specific labor
reallocation across municipalities. However, Foged and Peri (2016) document that most
worker mobility in Denmark takes place across firms within a municipality, confirming that
municipalities, even in the long run, are rather self-contained labor markets. Moreover,
we regress the share of workers moving into or out of a given municipality on the lagged
predicted wage gaps. We do not find any statistically significant association between labor
flows and wage gap changes, as reported in the first panel of Table 3. This result further
confirms that the changes in the distribution of skills are not driven by migration across
municipalities.
Second, trade-induced wage gap changes may affect the age composition of the workforce
such that we observe skill polarization. Since we control for detailed workforce composition
characteristics at the municipality level in all of our specifications, this potential channel
is less of a concern. However, it is nevertheless useful to demonstrate that the impact
of trade-induced wage gap changes on the skill distribution is not driven by adjustments
at the extensive margin to provide further confidence in the interpretation of our results.
According to the age composition channel, older (younger) workers who are relatively less
(more) skilled may decide to retire (enter the labor market) earlier as a result of the changes
to the wage gaps induced by trade reported in the first-step estimation. This could affect the
age composition and as a result the skill composition of the workforce at the municipality
level. To test this potential channel, we regress the share of workers younger than 35 and
that of workers older than 55 on the lagged predicted wage gap changes at the municipality
their-competitiveness-as-a-result-2016-10.
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level (we also remove the age controls from the specification). We report the results in the
lower panel of Table 3. The age composition channel does not seem to exhaustively explain
the coefficients in our baseline estimates in Table 2. While the share of workers younger than
35 is only marginally correlated with the predicted wage gap changes, the share of workers
older than 55 is not significantly affected by wage gap changes. Hence, age composition is
not a key driver of our baseline results.
5.2.2 Alternative Measures of Skills
In this section, as part of our robustness checks, we use five alternative measures of skills to
run the regressions in the second step of our empirical analyses. The results are reported in
Table 4. The first alternative measure (i.e., skill definition 2) simply relies on the workers’
years of education, as in Blanchard and Olney (2017). However, the main limitation of this
measure is that it only captures those skills acquired through formal schooling and, contrary
to skill definition 1, it is not adjusted for the quality of skills.
The next three definitions of skills are based on workers’ wages. Because such measures
reflect not only skills but also an individual’s unobserved characteristics and firm-level wage
policies, we estimate an additive “two-way” worker-firm effects model and decompose wages
into the following four components using the methodology developed in Abowd et al. (1999)
for each gender separately (AKM model, henceforth): i) a systematic component related
to observable worker characteristics (age, work experience, tenure and years of education),
ii) an unobservable time-invariant component at the worker level, iii) firm fixed effects, and
iv) a residual. Similar to Iranzo et al. (2008) and Irarrazabal et al. (2013), we use the
predicted wages due to the observable characteristics (i.e., the systematic component above)
as a comprehensive measure of both formal and informal skills for our skill definition 3.
For skill definitions 4 and 5, we calculate the skill measure by excluding age and both age
and tenure, respectively, from the systematic component of wages. This is done to take
into account those cases in which age or tenure do not exactly reflect the upgrading of the
skills acquired in the labor market but rather a mechanical improvement of wages related to
seniority. Buhai et al. (2014) document, for example, that there are significant returns to
seniority in Denmark.
The last alternative skill measure (skill definition 6) is based on the systematic part of
the wage regression estimated with job-spell fixed effects. This wage regression model is
less restrictive than the AKM model, because it does not require the conditional exogenous
mobility assumption (Krishna et al., 2014).25
25The inclusion of time-invariant match effects in the wage regression accounts for the endogenous assign-
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By using these alternative measures of skills to calculate the first two moments of the
skill distribution at the municipality level, we find that the effects of the trade-induced wage
gap changes on the skill distribution, as presented in Table 4, are very similar (i.e., in terms
of sign, statistical significance and magnitude) to our baseline results in Table 2. According
to the results reported for skill definition 2, for example, a one-standard-deviation increase
in the predicted wage gap, ∆ˆ2 (∆ˆ1), leads to a 11 percent increase (1.6 percent decrease)
in the mean of skills and a 20 (2.5) percent increase (decrease) in the standard deviation of
skill.
5.2.3 Alternative Measures of Trade Activity
In this section, we assess the sensitivity of our main results to alternative measures of trade
activity. First, we investigate whether the effects of trade on the wage gaps are heterogeneous
across destination markets. To do so, we distinguish between exports to the developed
economies (north) and those to developing countries (south). Table 5 includes the results.
Our benchmark results appear to be driven by trade with the south, as the impact of trade
with the north on wage gaps is not statistically significant. The results show that ∆2 increases
and that ∆1 decreases with exports to the south, which is consistent with the Samuelson-
Stolper hypothesis (Costinot and Vogel, 2010). The second step shows that the effects of
trade with the south on the skill distribution are qualitatively consistent with our baseline
results, i.e., the wage gap changes induced by trade with the south shift the skill distribution
to the right and increase skill dispersion in local labor markets.
In the next sensitivity exercise, we replace the export value in the baseline with the
import value as a measure of trade activity. To do so, we re-calculate our instrument by
examining changes in the world export supply to all countries for each product (minus
Denmark’s export value) gathered from U.N. COMTRADE data. Our assumption is that
a measure based on the rest of the world’s export supply can be safely assumed to be
exogenous to Danish import activities. The results based on this alternative measure of
trade are reported in Table 6. The estimates are similar to our baseline findings, i.e., the
import value affects the wage gaps, and the impact on the first two moments of the skill
distribution at the municipality level is statistically significant and in the same direction as
our baseline results.
ment of workers to firms due to the component of match-specific ability that is time invariant. Thus, in
estimating the wage regression with job-spell fixed effects, we assume that worker mobility is random condi-
tional on time-invariant match-specific worker ability and time-varying worker and firm characteristics. This
is a less restrictive assumption that the one required by the AKM model, i.e. exogenous mobility conditional
on observables. The main limitation of the job-spell fixed effects model is that it does not allow to separately
identify individual fixed effects, which are an important component of our main skill definition.
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Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in the predicted change in the trade-
induced wage gap ∆ˆ2 (∆ˆ1) leads to a 10 percent increase (3 percent decrease) in the skill
mean, as well as a 20 percent increase (8 percent decrease) in the standard deviation of skills
in local labor markets. The qualitative impact of the import value on the skill distribution
is similar to that estimated using the export value and reveals that trade increases skill
polarization in Denmark.
Next, we investigate whether the impact of trade on the skill distribution depends on
the type of product exported. Blanchard and Olney (2017) show that the composition of
trade plays a crucial role in affecting the incentives for acquiring education. They find
that growth in less-skill-intensive exports depresses average educational attainment, while
growth in highly skill-intensive exports increases schooling. The estimated coefficient on
total exports may conceal these opposing effects on the acquisition of skills. Hence, we
construct the export value separately for high- and low-skill-intensive industries. To do
so, we distinguish between industries with R&D expenditures above the country average
(regarded as high-tech industries) and those with below-average R&D expenditures (defined
as low-tech industries). Information on R&D expenditures at the 3-digit NACE industry
level is retrieved from the OECD database. Estimating our baseline model separately for
the two types of industries also allows us to further tease out the impact of trade from that of
SBTC. Table 7 and Table 8 present the results for trade activity for high-tech and low-tech
industries, respectively.
Unlike the evidence reported in Blanchard and Olney (2017), we do not find substantially
different patterns across these two groups of sectors. Our results are consistent with the
baseline evidence reported in Table 2. The mean and standard deviation of skills in local
labor markets are positively affected by the predicted change in wage gap in both types
of sectors. However, the magnitude involved in the effects of ∆ˆ2 on the skill moments is
much larger when we focus on the high-tech industries compared to the baseline result. A
one-standard-deviation increase in the predicted wage gap, ∆ˆ2 (∆ˆ1), triggers a 19 percent
increase (4 percent decrease) in the skill mean and a 38 percent increase (7 percent decrease)
in the standard deviation of skills.
Finally, we also investigate whether our baseline results change when we focus on the
manufacturing sector only (Table 9), as in Blanchard and Olney (2017). These results are
also similar to our baseline results in Table 2.
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5.2.4 Alternative IV Strategies
One of the main assumptions behind our identification strategy is that changes in non-Danish
imports from non-Danish markets are orthogonal to industry-specific shocks occurring in
Denmark. We deem this assumption plausible because Denmark is a small economy of fewer
than 6 million people and represents a small share of trade. However, to further remove
any possible correlation between the instrument and the residual in Equation 1, we exclude
those countries that share similar business cycles to Denmark, as higher imports from these
markets may be correlated with the error term in Equations (1) and (3), if their imports
are triggered by demand shocks correlated with those occurring in Denmark. Hence, we
exclude Germany, Sweden, and the United States while estimating Equation 2. The results
are reported in Table 10 and are also consistent with those obtained in the baseline analysis.
Next, as an additional check, we re-estimate our baseline specification while excluding
industries in which demand or technology shocks are more likely to be correlated across
countries. Following Colantone et al. (2015), these industries are: the manufacture of coke,
refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel (NACE 23); the manufacture of rubber and
plastic products (NACE 25); the manufacture of radio, television and communication equip-
ment and apparatus (NACE 32); air transport (NACE 62); and post and telecommunications
(NACE 64). The result is reported in Table 11, and it confirms the robustness of our baseline
results.
We also follow Autor et al. (2013) in excluding an alternative group of seven industries
that have experienced substantial fluctuations over the sample period across countries, due
to technological innovations, housing booms, and the rapid growth of emerging economies.
These industries are the manufacture of textiles and manufacture of wearing apparel (NACE
17); the dressing and dyeing of fur (NACE 18); the tanning and dressing of leather and
the manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear (NACE 19); the
manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products (NACE 26); the manufacture of basic
metals (NACE 27); the manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and
equipment (NACE 28); and the manufacture of office machinery and computers (NACE 30).
The result is reported in Table 12, and it also confirms the robustness of our baseline results.
5.2.5 Additional lags
We now check whether our results are sensitive to the specification of the first-year lag in
the second step of our regressions. We therefore run these regressions by including either
a two-year or a three-year lag instead of a one-year lag to allow more time for the skill
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distribution to adjust to changes in the trade-induced wage gap. The findings from this last
check are reported in Table 13. The coefficients estimated on the two- or three-year lag are
slightly larger in magnitudes. This suggests that the effect is becoming stronger when we
increase the number of lagged years and it is consistent with the notion that skill investment
does not happen instantaneously.
5.3 The Role of institutions: The Case of Portugal
Thus far, our empirical analysis focuses on the Danish case. Our results show that trade-
induced wage gap changes result in higher average skills and higher variance of skills, leading
to skill polarization in Denmark. These findings may be due to certain Danish institutions,
i.e., a flexible labor market and generous education policies, which enable workers to eas-
ily adjust their skills in response to changes in wage gaps. Such effects of trade on the
skill distribution may be eliminated or become weaker in a different setting where workers
face higher adjustment costs, i.e., a frictional labor market and/or costly education. To
investigate whether this is the case, we extend our datasets and analyses to Portugal.
For the purpose of our paper, Portugal provides a good comparison to Denmark for the
following two reasons. First, both countries are small, highly export-oriented with a few
trading partners, and have similar export composition. Second, they are extremely different
in terms of labor market institutions and education policies. On the one hand, as described in
the previous section, Denmark provides abundant subsidies for individuals to upgrade skills.
The support takes the form not only of formal schooling but also comprehensive active labor
market policies intended to keep the skills of the workforce updated. Denmark also has
an extremely flexible labor market, which reduces the frictions hindering labor reallocation
across firms. On the other hand, by contrast, Portugal is characterized by one of the most
rigid labor markets in the world (Botero et al., 2004), with less-generous education policies
and less emphasis on lifelong learning opportunities.
Specifically, wage-setting in the Portuguese labor market is highly regulated, consisting
of mandatory minimum wages and the widespread use of (centralized) collective wage bar-
gaining at the sector level (Card et al., 2016). Roughly 90 percent of private sector jobs are
covered by sector-wide collective agreements negotiated by employer associations and trade
unions (Addison et al., 2016), where almost all minimum working conditions (e.g., wage
floors for each category of workers, overtime pay and normal working hours) are set.
Furthermore, Portugal still lags behind EU targets set for 2020 regarding educational
attainment and early school-leaving rates. Over 60 percent of the population aged 25-64 has
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an education level lower than upper-secondary education, which ranks as the third-largest
share in the OECD area (OECD, 2015). In addition, the public resources available to
support students acquiring higher education are scant relative to Denmark.26 The numerus
clausus system in Portuguese public universities only allows a fixed number of students to
be admitted every year on a competitive basis, while private institutions that charge higher
tuition fees are left as the only alternative for those who cannot obtain a spot in a public
university. As a result, Portugal has the highest association between students’ socio-economic
background and their educational attainment among the OECD countries (OECD, 2015).
Finally, Portuguese active labor market policies (ALMPs) are characterized by a lower
level of vocational training for the unemployed than the corresponding Danish policies. Al-
though public expenditures on ALMPs increased at the beginning of the financial crisis and
peaked in 2008 at 0.63 percent of GDP, they have declined in subsequent years and have been
below those of Denmark (and other Nordic countries), where expenditures on ALMPs have
been above 1 percent of GDP since 2009 (ILO, 2014). The scarce resources for retraining
the unemployed also contribute to Portugal’s longer unemployment duration compared to
other countries (Blanchard and Portugal, 2001; OECD, 2015).
Due to the institutional differences and trade similarities between the two economies, we
expect the effects of trade-induced wage gap changes on the skill distribution to be stronger
for Denmark than for Portugal. The comparison between these two economies enables us
to examine whether the impact of trade integration on the skill distribution is mediated by
flexible labor market and generous education policies.
We conduct the same empirical analysis described above using “Quadros de Pessoal”
(QP), a matched employer-employee dataset for Portugal. The QP dataset is comparable to
the IDA dataset for Denmark in its structure and content (Buhai et al., 2014). It is an annual,
mandatory employment survey administered by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment and
covers all firms (with at least one wage earner) and their establishments and employees. The
analysis of the Portuguese case is thus based on all active firms in the dataset over the period
1993–2012.27 Individual-level data files are used to estimate measures of wage gaps, workforce
characteristics (e.g., the share of workers with secondary and tertiary education, the share of
male employees, workers’ average age, and work experience), and firm characteristics (e.g.,
labor productivity and location). They are comparable to those used for Denmark.28
26Tuition fees vary between 950 and 1250 euros per academic year for full-time students enrolled in
bachelor’s or master’s programs in public higher education institutions. For PhD degrees, the average
tuition fee amounts to approximately 3000 euros per academic year.
27The year 2001 is missing, as no data were collected at the worker level in this year by the Portuguese
Ministry of Employment.
28The QP dataset provides very detailed information on earnings, by including the base wage (gross pay for
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Similar to Denmark, the measures of wage gap changes are aggregated but at the 3-digit
industry-level29, whereas the first two moments of the skill distribution are further aggregated
at the municipality level using the weighted average of the municipal industry mix.30 Trade
information at the industry level is obtained from Statistics Portugal and merged with the
QP dataset. Finally, following the Danish case, we construct the relevant instruments for
Portuguese trade shocks by industry based on information from U.N. COMTRADE at the
product level. The link between 3-digit industries, the relevant 4-digit products exported,
and the destination countries is provided by Statistics Portugal. Firm-level characteristics
(such as labor productivity) are also aggregated at the industry (municipality) level for the
first- (second-) stage regression.
The results for Portugal are presented in Table 14. We find that trade has a significant
and positive effect on both wage gap measures (∆1 and ∆2), and that the magnitudes
observed are comparable to those estimated for the Danish case. A one-standard-deviation
increase in the export value implies an approximately 8.5 (4.3) percent increase in ∆2 (∆1).
Estimates from the second step, however, show that the average level of skills is not affected
as much as that in Danish case: A one-standard-deviation increase in the predicted wage
gap, ∆ˆ2, leads to a mere 0.6 percent increase in the skill mean and a mere 0.2 percent
increase in the standard deviation of skills at the municipality level. Moreover, the impact
of ∆ˆ1 on the skill mean is statistically insignificant, while a one-standard-deviation increase
in ∆ˆ1 decreases the standard deviation of skills only by 0.4 percent.
Abstracting from institutional and labor market frictions, one would expect the increas-
ing wage gaps in Portugal (as we find in the first step) to encourage both the medium and
the low skill workers to upgrade their skills, and thus to increase the municipality skill mean
and leave the skill standard deviation change ambiguous. However, this is not the case.
Despite significant changes to wage gaps for Portugal, their estimated impact on the skill
distribution is much lower than the one reported in the Danish case. Given how similar these
two countries are except for their labor market structure and education policies, our results
suggest that institutional factors and labor market frictions may affect how a country’s skill
normal hours of work), regular benefits and overtime pay. Since it is mandatory for the employer to provide
and make this information available to the public for each establishment, this reinforces the reliability and
accuracy of the wage data. We construct our monthly wage measure based on both workers’ base earnings
and any regular wage supplements, after excluding outliers (the top and bottom 1 percent of each year’s
wage earners).
29The Portuguese Classification of Economic Activities (CAE, comparable to NACE) underwent several
changes over the period considered. To perform the empirical analysis over the same period covered by
the Danish data (1993–2012), we standardize all industry classifications according to the earlier versions
of NACE rev. 1.1, which is more aggregated than later versions (NACE rev. 2). This corresponds to
approximately 80 (3-digit) industries every year.
30The Portuguese Classification of local labor markets includes approximately 300 municipalities.
26
distribution responds to trade shocks. A rigid labor market and less-generous education
policies can attenuate responses of the skill distribution, as in the Portuguese case. This
finding is explained through our conceptual framework below in Section 6, where we incor-
porate a reduced form of labor market frictions to study the interaction between domestic
institutions and the impact of trade on skill distribution.
6 Theoretical Intuition
Our empirical results highlight three important findings. First, international trade has sig-
nificant effects on the wage gaps for skilled and unskilled workers. In particular, in Denmark,
international trade decreases the wage gap of medium-to-low-skill workers, while it increases
the wage gap of high-to-medium skill workers. Second, changes in the trade-induced wage
gaps have a significant effect on the Danish skill distribution. Specifically, the predicted
trade-induced wage gaps increase both the mean and variance of skills in Denmark, which
results in skill polarization. That is, the extreme skills at both tails become more abundant.
Third, comparing results for Denmark and Portugal sheds light on the importance of labor
market frictions and education policies in affecting the impact of trade on the skill distri-
bution. In this section, we explain the last two results using a tractable partial equilibrium
framework that links the skill choices by heterogeneous individuals to exogenous wage gap
shocks, while the first result can already be rationalized by existing trade theories, such as
those by Costinot and Vogel (2010).31
6.1 A Three-Period Skill Upgrading Example
A country is populated by a continuum of heterogeneous agents with unit mass. Each
individual i has a unique level of inherent ability, ai, which is bounded, 0 < a ≤ ai ≤ a¯,
and remains constant over one’s life span. Ability, a, is distributed continuously with a
cumulative distribution function denoted by F (a) with the corresponding density function
denoted by f(a).
Each individual lives three periods, and each period is of length one. In each period
t, individual i decides to acquire skills that are one level higher or continue working with
her existing skills. We denote this decision using an indicator function Iit, where Iit = 1 if
31While favoring a simple theoretical intuition, we do not explicitly model the origins of wage gap shocks.
In the empirical analysis, we focus on changes in wage gaps that are induced by trade integration, because
trade integration is one of the primary sources of factor price changes. Therefore, the model builds on the
exogenous change in wage-gaps and its effect on the skill distribution.
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individual i decides to upgrade skills; otherwise, Iit = 0. If Iit = 0, the individual continues
to earn wages, w(sit), based on her current skill level, sit. If Iit = 1, then in the next
period, she will earn a higher wage, w(sit+ e¯), corresponding to her new skill level. However,
acquiring skills that are one level higher requires a fixed amount of credits, e¯, and has an
opportunity cost in terms of the wages not earned during the time spent upgrading skills.
This opportunity cost increases with the required units of credits and decreases with the
innate ability of the individual. More succinctly, the opportunity cost of skill upgrading for
individual i is simply e¯
ai
.
Each individual maximizes her lifetime utility based on consumption, cit. We assume
that each individual can perfectly smooth her consumption over her lifetime, financed by her
lifetime income, W ; i.e., W ≡∑3t=1w(sit)pt(1− Iit e¯ai ).32 We write individual i’s skill choice
problem as follows:
Vi = max
Iit
U(ci1) + βU(ci2) + β
2U(ci3)
s.t.
3∑
t=1
citpt =
3∑
t=1
w(sit)pt(1− Iit e¯
ai
), sit = s+
t−1∑
k=1
e¯Iik.
where U(cit) denotes the utility from consumption, pt is the price in each period, s is the
lowest skill level that each individual is born with in the first period, and skill upgrading is
simply an additive process to the previous skill level via earning a fixed credit, e¯. We assume
that the wage is an increasing and concave function of skills (dw
ds
> 0, d
2w
ds2
< 0).33 Finally,
we assume that inflation is non-negative (i.e., p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p3).
In the this setup, ability thresholds, A1 and A2 (where a < A1 < A2 < a¯), exist such
that the whole population is divided into those who acquire no new skills (low-skill workers),
those who acquire skills that are one level higher (medium-skill workers), and those who
acquire total skills that are two levels higher (high-skill workers):
A1 =
w(s)p1e¯
(p2 + p3)∆1
, A2 =
[w(s) + ∆1]p2e¯
p3∆2
(5)
32Relaxing this assumption requires non-zero consumption, cit, in each period. Qualitatively, the analysis
remains unchanged, and therefore, we make this assumption for simplicity to present closed-form solutions
for the analysis below.
33These assumptions imply that there is always a positive return for upgrading skills in terms of wages
and that the marginal benefit of upgrading skills decreases. This is closer to what we observe in the
data, where the median annual earnings of full-time, year-round wage and salary workers for ages 25 − 34
by educational attainment in the USA in 2012 shows an approximate wage differential of $18, 000 for
high school and college education versus $12, 000 for college and university education. See, for example,
http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=77.
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where ∆1 ≡ w(s + e¯) − w(s) is the wage gap of medium-to-low-skill workers, ∆2 ≡ w(s +
2e¯)− w(s+ e¯) is the wage gap of high-to-medium-skill workers, and ∆1 > ∆2.34
If an individual’s ability is less than the lower threshold (ai ≤ A1), her lifetime utility is
maximized by not upgrading skills. If an individual’s ability is between the two thresholds
(A1 < ai ≤ A2), her lifetime utility is maximized by upgrading skills once in the first period.
If an individual’s ability is above the higher threshold (ai > A2), her lifetime utility is
maximized by upgrading skills twice (once in each period). We provide detailed solutions in
the Appendix A. Without loss of generality, we assume that A1 is below the medium ability
while A2 is above the medium ability. That is, a¯+ a < 2A2 and a¯+ a > 2A1.
Using this framework, it is straightforward to show how exogenous changes in the wage
gaps, ∆1 and ∆2, affect the ability threshold levels, A1 and A2, and thus the skill distribution.
In particular, an increase in ∆1 decreases A1 (
∂A1
∂∆1
< 0) while increasing A2 (
∂A2
∂∆1
|∆2|) > 0. An
increase in ∆2 does not affect A1 but decreases A2 (
∂A2
∂∆2
|∆1|) < 0. The detailed mathematical
proofs are in Appendix A. These changes in thresholds in response to wage gap changes have
implications for the overall skill distribution as follows.
We denote the skill mean by E(s) and the skill variance by V ar(s) and assume that
ability is uniformly distributed. We find the following:
• If | ∂A1
∂∆1
| < | ∂A2
∂∆1
|∆2|, an increase in ∆1 decreases E(s) and V ar(s).
• An increase in ∆2 increases E(s) and V ar(s).
When ∆1 increases, the return to acquiring skills for the low-ability individuals increases,
while the opportunity cost of acquiring skills for the medium-ability individuals increases. As
a result, thresholds A1 and A2 move further apart. Some low-ability individuals who would
never have upgraded their skills now will upgrade their skills once, while some medium-
ability individuals who would have upgraded their skills twice now will only upgrade their
skills once. Consequently, conditional on ability having a uniform distribution, the mean
and variance will be affected: If the increase in A2 is larger than the decrease in A1, then
both the skill mean and variance will decrease. In our empirical results, trade shocks induce
a decrease in ∆1; hence, according to the above theory, both the skill mean and variance will
increase.
In the case of an increase in ∆2, the return from acquiring skills twice increases, A2
decreases, and hence, more medium-ability individuals would acquire skills twice, while low-
34Note that wage level in our theoretical setup corresponds to the logged wage level in our empirical setup.
In particular, the wage gaps, ∆1 and ∆2, are log-transformations of wage gaps from our empirical setup,
e.g., log(∆2) ≡ log(w90/w50) ≡ log(w90)− log(w50).
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ability workers are unaffected. This results in a higher aggregate mean and a more diverse
skill distribution. The above predictions are consistent with our empirical results for Den-
mark, where we report a higher skill mean and skill variance (i.e., skill polarization) due to
exogenous changes in the trade-induced wage gaps.
6.2 An Extension with Domestic Institutions
Thus far, the labor market in the model is assumed to be fully flexible in the sense that
as long as an individual upgrades skills, she will find a job that pays the skill-matching
wage each period. Now, we extend the model by assuming that the labor market is rigid
due to uncertainty in finding a job with the skill-matching wage after skill upgrading. Such
uncertainty could be viewed as a reduced form of a regulated labor market that limits
turnover rates. We denote by θ the probability of finding a job with the skill-matching wage
and by (1 − θ) the probability of having a wage that corresponds to skills one level lower
than the acquired skills. The smaller θ is, the more rigid the labor market.35
Under this additional assumption and assuming a risk-neutral agent, the new ability
thresholds, A1 and A2, are now also a function of the labor market friction (θ) and are as
follows:
A1 =
w(s)p1e¯
θ(p2 + p3)∆1
, A2 =
[w(s) + θ∆1]p2e¯
p3[θ∆2 + (1− θ)∆1] (6)
For simplicity, we restrict the range of θ such that the skill upgrading decision is mono-
tonic. This is similar to assuming that A1 < A2 to facilitate comparison across the two
versions of the model.36 Intuitively, the labor market friction (θ) affects the return to and
the opportunity cost of skill upgrading. In the case of a frictionless market, the return to
skill upgrading is higher but the opportunity cost is either the same or lower. The labor
market friction, however, entails that when ∆1 increases, A1 decreases; however, A2 increases
for a large θ and decreases for a small θ, leaving the effect of ∆1 on the skill distribution am-
biguous and conditional on the size of θ. The intuition is that the uncertainty in skill-wage
matching simultaneously reduces the return to and the opportunity cost of skill upgrading.
It is then the relative reduction in these two components in the skill upgrading decision that
determines whether A2 increases, decreases or remains unchanged and, thus, determines the
changes in the skill distribution.37
35See the mathematical details in Appendix A.
36For A1 < A2 to hold, θ needs to satisfy a certain condition. We prove that the condition is consistent
with 0 < θ ≤ 1. See Appendix A for details.
37Let ¯ be a cutoff of θ such that when θ = ¯, the reduction in the return to and cost of upgrading is equal,
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In a frictional labor market, when ∆2 increases, A2 decreases; hence, the implication for
the skill distribution remains the same as before when θ = 1, i.e., a higher skill mean and
variance, except the effect is smaller. To summarize, when the labor market is rigid, i.e.,
when θ < 1, we have the following.
Denote the mean by E(s) and the variance by V ar(s), and assuming that ability is
uniformly distributed and 0 < θ < 1:
• An increase in ∆1 has an ambiguous effect on the E(s) and V ar(s) of skills.
• An increase in ∆2 increases both the E(s) and V ar(s) of skills but with a smaller
magnitude relative to when θ = 1.
The first implication above is that the distributional effects on skills depend not only on
the on the relative changes in A1 and A2 (as in the frictionless environment) but also on the
size of θ, as discussed above. It is therefore an empirical question to study the distributional
effects of ∆1 on the skill distribution in a frictional labor market.
The second implication above is that the effect of ∆2 on A2 is always smaller in a frictional
labor market than in a flexible labor market. In summary, in the presence of frictions in
the labor market, we are agnostic about the distributional effects on skills when ∆1 changes
but are certain that the effects are expected to be much less pronounced when ∆2 changes.
These conclusions are consistent with our empirical results for Portugal relative to those for
Denmark.
7 Conclusion
Our paper shows that exogenous changes in wage gaps induced by trade significantly affect
average skill levels and the variation in skills in a flexible labor market, such as Denmark,
but these moments are less affected in a frictional labor market, such as Portugal. As a result
we conclude that economies such as Denmark in which supply adjusts easily to exogenous
demand shocks reveal skill polarization. We present a simple theoretical intuition on the
link between changes in wage gaps and individual skill-upgrading decisions. We show that
the exogenous changes in the wage gaps affect the opportunity cost of and returns to skill
upgrading, which translates into significant effects on the skill distribution in a flexible labor
market. However, the above effects are smaller for a frictional labor market.
and therefore, | ∂A2∂∆1 |∆2 | = 0; above ¯, the reduction in the return to is more than the reduction in the cost of
upgrading, and therefore, | ∂A2∂∆1 |∆2 | > 0; and below ¯, the reduction in the cost of is more than the reduction
in the return to upgrading, and therefore, | ∂A2∂∆1 |∆2 | < 0. See Appendix A.
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This study informs policymakers about how exogenous demand shocks such as trade
integration can affect the skill distribution through skill supply responses. The population
aging faced by many developed economies is often the primary culprit for the looming concern
about the hollowing-out of mid-level skills. Our paper informs policymakers that the supply-
side responses (in economies with flexible labor markets and generous education policies) to
exogenous demand shocks (such as those brought by trade integration) are also an important
driver and should be accounted for when designing policies.
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Figure 1: Destination of Danish Export
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Figure 2: Wage Gap and Skills over Time
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Table 2: Effects of Trade Activity on the Wage Gap and Skill Distribution
Step 1 w90/w50 w50/w10
Export 0.003*** -0.018***
(0.000) (0.001)
F stat 30746.35 30746.35
N 8,566 8,566
R-sq 0.142 0.227
OLS
Step 2, skill definition 1 Mean SD Mean SD
Predicted w90/w50, one-year lag 10.030*** 9.550***
(0.262) (0.237)
Predicted w50/w10, one-year lag -1.726*** -1.643***
(0.057) (0.043)
N 1,764 1764 1764 1764
R-sq 0.887 0.768 0.887 0.768
GMM
Step 2, skill definition 1 Mean SD Mean SD
Predicted w90/w50, first-year lag 5.812*** 3.146***
(0.333) (0.225)
Predicted w50/w10, first-year lag -1.000*** -0.541***
(0.059) (0.044)
N 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764
Wald Wald chi-sq 57070.748 40520.625 57070.748 40520.625
Notes: Skill definition 1 is based on the multidimensional index of workers’ human capital. In the first
step, export is instrumented with world import demand (see Equation 2), and standard errors are
clustered at the industry level. The first step includes the following control variables: industry sales
per employee, industry capital intensity, industry workforce composition characteristics, and year
and 2-digit industry dummies. The second step includes the lag of the dependent variable and the
following control variables averaged at the municipality level: the lag of sales per employee average,
capital intensity and workforce composition characteristics, plus year and municipality dummies.
The second step is estimated by using either OLS (second panel) or the system GMM estimator (third
panel), and the standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and sequentially bootstrapped
with step 1, 200 replications. Estimates in the second step are weighted by the number of employed
individuals at the municipality level. Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 3: Effects of Trade-Induced Wage Gaps on Workforce Composition
Share of workers moving into the municipality Share of workers moving out of the municipality
Predicted w90/w50, first-year lag 0.639 -0.328
(1.305) (0.874)
Predicted w50/w10, first-year lag -1.221 1.077
(1.529) (1.330)
N 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764
Wald chi-sq 30400.188 19756.005 20456.176 16789.789
Share of workers younger than 35 Share of workers older than 55
Predicted w90/w50, first-year lag 0.255* -0.026
(0.144) (0.044)
Predicted w50/w10, first-year lag -0.118* 0.015
(0.066) (0.020)
N 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764
Wald chi-sq 40700.345 41659.345 10345.677 11345.906
Notes: The specifications of the first and second steps are the same as those reported in Table 2, with
the only exception being the second step in the second panel, where we exclude workers’ average age
from the set of control variables. The second step is estimated by using the system GMM estimator,
and the standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and sequentially bootstrapped with
step 1, 200 replications. Estimates in the second step are weighted by the number of employed
individuals at the municipality level. Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 4: Effects of Trade-Induced Wage Gaps on the Skill Distribution: Alternative Skill
definitions
Step 2, skill definition 2 Mean SD Mean SD
Predicted w90/w50, first-year lag 2.633*** 0.940***
(0.366) (0.185)
Predicted w50/w10, first-year lag -0.453*** -0.162***
(0.074) (0.050)
N 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764
Wald chi-sq 57070.748 40520.625 57070.748 40520.625
Step 2, skill definition 3 Mean SD Mean SD
Predicted w90/w50, first-year lag 0.526*** 0.094***
(0.025) (0.013)
Predicted w50/w10, first-year lag -0.091*** -0.016***
(0.004) (0.003)
N 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764
Wald chi-sq 10456.765 9843.345 10456.765 9843.345
Step 2, skill definition 4 Mean SD Mean SD
Predicted w90/w50, first-year lag 0.481*** 0.170***
(0.024) (0.011)
Predicted w50/w10, first-year lag -0.083*** -0.029***
(0.004) (0.002)
N 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764
Wald chi-sq 10456.765 9843.345 10456.765 9843.345
Step 2, skill definition 5 Mean SD Mean SD
Predicted w90/w50, first-year lag 0.484*** 0.193***
(0.020) (0.011)
Predicted w50/w10, first-year lag -0.083*** -0.033***
(0.003) (0.002)
N 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764
Wald chi-sq 10456.765 9843.345 10456.765 9843.345
Step 2, skill definition 6 Mean SD Mean SD
Predicted w90/w50, first-year lag 0.619*** 0.350***
(0.039) (0.020)
Predicted w50/w10, first-year lag -0.107*** -0.060***
(0.006) (0.003)
N 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764
Wald chi-sq 11009.342 9987.673 11009.342 9987.673
Notes: Skill definition 2 is based on years of education. Skill definition 3 is based on the systematic
component of the two-way fixed effects wage regression. Skill definitions 4 and 5 are based on
the systematic component of the two-way fixed effects wage regression, without age and without
age and tenure, respectively. Skill definition 6 is based on the whole systematic component of the
wage regression with spell fixed effects. In first step, standard errors are clustered at the industry
level. The second step is estimated by using the system GMM estimator, and the standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level and sequentially bootstrapped with step 1, 200 replications.
Estimates in the second step are weighted by the number of employed individuals at the municipality
level. The specifications of the first and second steps are the same as those reported in Table 2.
Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 5: Effects of Trade Activity on the Wage Gap and Skill Distribution: The Role of
Export Destination
Step 1 w90/w50 w50/w10
Export North 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Export South 0.006*** -0.011***
(0.000) (0.001)
F stat 3834.16 3834.155
N 8,566 8566
R-sq 0.159 0.408
Step 2, skill definition 1 Mean SD Mean SD
Predicted w90/w50, first-year lag 4.532*** 2.418***
(0.332) (0.249)
Predicted w50/w10, first-year lag -0.969*** -0.473***
(0.050) (0.040)
N 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764
Wald chi-sq 55189.003 30897.122 55189.003 30897.122
Notes: Skill definition 1 is based on the multidimensional index of workers’ human capital. In the
first step, export north and export south are instrumented with world import demand separately
for north and south, and standard errors are clustered at the industry level. The second step
is estimated by using the system GMM estimator, and the standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level and sequentially bootstrapped with step 1, 200 replications. Estimates in the
second step are weighted by the number of employed individuals at the municipality level. The
specifications for the first and second steps are the same as those reported in Table 2. Significance
levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 6: Effects of Trade Activity on the Wage Gap and Skill Distribution: The Role of
Imports
Step 1 w90/w50 w50/w10
Import 0.004*** -0.008***
(0.000) (0.001)
F stat 31199.44 31199.44
N 8,566 8,566
R-sq 0.154 0.399
Step 2, skill definition 1 Mean SD Mean SD
Predicted w90/w50, first-year lag 3.974*** 2.515***
(0.120) (0.005)
Predicted w50/w10, first-year lag -1.538*** -0.812**
(0.095) (0.004)
N 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764
Wald chi-sq 56899.144 38987.489 56899.144 38987.489
Notes: skill definition 1 is based on the multidimensional index of workers’ human capital. In the
first step, import is instrumented with world export supply (see the equivalent of Equation 2, where
import volumes are replaced with export volumes), and standard errors are clustered at the industry
level. The second step is estimated by using the system GMM estimator, and the standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level and sequentially bootstrapped with step 1, 200 replications.
Estimates in the second step are weighted by the number of employed individuals at the municipality
level. The specifications of the first and second steps are the same as those reported in Table 2.
Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 7: Effects of Trade Activity on the Wage Gap and Skill Distribution: High-Tech
Sectors
Step 1 w90/w50 w50/w10
Export 0.009** -0.022***
(0.000) (0.003)
F stat 1285.377 1285.377
N 1,313 1,313
R-sq 0.255 0.472
Step 2, skill definition 1 Mean SD Mean SD
Predicted w90/w50, first-year lag 7.195*** 4.665***
(0.057) (0.040)
Predicted w50/w10, first-year lag -1.986*** -0.695***
(0.027) (0.019)
N 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764
Wald chi-sq 57854.120 37954.003 57854.120 37954.003
Notes: High-Tech sectors are those with R&D expenditures above the overall economy average.
Skill definition 1 is based on the multidimensional index of workers’ human capital. In the first
step, export is instrumented with world import demand (see Equation 2), and standard errors are
clustered at the industry level. The second step is estimated by using the system GMM estimator,
and the standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and sequentially bootstrapped with
step 1, 200 replications. Estimates in the second step are weighted by the number of employed
individuals at the municipality level. The specifications of the first and second steps are the same
as those reported in Table 2. Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%. Significance levels: ***1%,
**5%, *10%.
45
Table 8: Effects of Trade Activity on the Wage Gap and Skill Distribution: Low-Tech Sectors
Step 1 w90/w50 w50/w10
Export 0.003*** -0.016***
(0.001) (0.004)
F stat 2820.041 2820.041
N 6,157 6,157
R-sq 0.131 0.238
Step 2, skill definition 1 Mean SD Mean SD
Predicted w90/w50, first-year lag 1.420*** 0.385***
(0.076) (0.058)
Predicted w50/w10, first-year lag -0.255*** -0.069***
(0.015) (0.010)
N 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764
Wald chi-sq 51677.087 38000.765 51677.087 38000.765
Notes: Low-Tech sectors are those with R&D expenditures below the overall economy average.
Skill definition 1 is based on the multidimensional index of workers’ human capital. In the first
step, export is instrumented with world import demand (see Equation 2), and standard errors are
clustered at the industry level. The second step is estimated by using the system GMM estimator,
and the standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and sequentially bootstrapped with
step 1, 200 replications. Estimates in the second step are weighted by the number of employed
individuals at the municipality level. The specifications of the first and second steps are the same
as those reported in Table 2. Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%. Significance levels: ***1%,
**5%, *10%.
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Table 9: Effects of Trade Activity on the Wage Gap and Skill Distribution: Manufacturing
Sectors
Step 1 w90/w50 w50/w10
Export 0.004*** -0.067***
(0.000) (0.004)
F stat 7753.62 7753.62
N 3,379 3,379
R-sq 0.054 0.271
Step 2, skill definition 1 Mean SD Mean SD
Predicted w90/w50, first-year lag 4.316*** 3.255***
(0.514) (0.366)
Predicted w50/w10, first-year lag -0.735*** -0.390***
(0.031) (0.020)
N 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764
Wald chi-sq 53456.591 37654.998 53456.591 37654.998
Notes: Skill definition 1 is based on the multidimensional index of workers’ human capital. In the
first step, export is instrumented with world import demand (see Equation 2), and standard errors
are clustered at the industry level. The second step is estimated by using the system GMM estimator,
and the standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and sequentially bootstrapped with
step 1, 200 replications. The first step is estimated within the manufacturing sector only. Estimates
in the second step are weighted by the number of employed individuals at the municipality level. The
specifications of the first and second steps are the same as those reported in Table 2. Significance
levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
47
Table 10: Robustness Check for the Instrumental Variable: The Role of Correlated Business
Cycles across Countries
Step 1 w90/w50 w50/w10
Export 0.005*** -0.021***
(0.000) (0.001)
F stat 34768.76 34768.76
N 8,566 8,566
R-sq 0.134 0.224
Step 2, skill definition 1 Mean SD Mean SD
Predicted w90/w50, first-year lag 7.956*** 4.479***
(0.323) (0.244)
Predicted w50/w10, first-year lag -1.725*** -1.042***
(0.051) (0.045)
N 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764
Wald chi-sq 55200.644 39533.112 55200.644 39533.112
Notes: Skill definition 1 is based on the multidimensional index of workers’ human capital. In
the first step, export is instrumented with world import demand calculated by excluding Germany,
Sweden and the United States from Equation 2. In the first step, standard errors are clustered
at the industry level. The second step is estimated by using the system GMM estimator, and the
standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and sequentially bootstrapped with step 1,
200 replications. Estimates in the second step are weighted by the number of employed individuals
at the municipality level. The specifications of the first and second steps are the same as those
reported in Table 2. Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
48
Table 11: Robustness Check for the Instrumental Variable: The Role of Correlated Technol-
ogy or Demand Shocks (Colantone et al., 2015)
Step 1 w90/w50 w50/w10
Export 0.003*** -0.019***
(0.000) (0.001)
F stat 29370.04 29370.04
N 7,415 7,415
R-sq 0.158 0.412
Step 2, skill definition 1 Mean SD Mean SD
Predicted w90/w50, first-year lag 5.676*** 3.949***
(0.373) (0.272)
Predicted w50/w10, first-year lag -1.082*** -0.670***
(0.053) (0.043)
N 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764
Wald chi-sq 54665.578 40100.334 54665.578 40100.334
Notes: Skill definition 1 is based on the multidimensional index of workers’ human capital. In the
first step, export is instrumented with world import demand calculated by excluding from Equation
2 the following industries: the manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
(NACE 23); the manufacture of rubber and plastic products (NACE 25); the manufacture of radio,
television and communication equipment and apparatus (NACE 32); air transport (NACE 62); and
post and telecommunications (NACE 64). In first step, standard errors are clustered at the industry
level. In the second step, standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and sequentially
bootstrapped with step 1, 200 replications. Estimates in the second step are weighted by the number
of employed individuals at the municipality level. The specifications of the first and second steps
are the same as those reported in Table 2. Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 12: Robustness Check for Instrumental Variable: The Role of Correlated Technology
or Demand Shocks (Autor et al., 2013)
Step 1 w90/w50 w50/w10
Export 0.003*** -0.017***
(0.000) (0.001)
F stat 27887.92 27887.92
N 6,866 6,866
R-sq 0.1644956 0.4136645
Step 2, skill definition 1 Mean SD Mean SD
Predicted w90/w50, first-year lag 5.107*** 3.169***
(0.328) (0.285)
Predicted w50/w10, first-year lag -1.071*** -0.519***
(0.055) (0.046)
N 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764
Wald chi-sq 54665.578 40100.334 54665.578 40100.334
Notes: Skill definition 1 is based on the multidimensional index of workers’ human capital. In
the first step, export is instrumented with world import demand calculated by excluding from
Equation 2 the following industries: the manufacture of textiles and manufacture of wearing apparel
(NACE 17); the dressing and dyeing of fur (NACE 18); the tanning and dressing of leather; the
manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear (NACE 19); the manufacture
of other non-metallic mineral products (NACE 26); the manufacture of basic metals (NACE 27);
the manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment (NACE 28); and
the manufacture of office machinery and computers (NACE 30). In first step, standard errors are
clustered at the industry level. The second step is estimated by using the system GMM estimator,
and the standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and sequentially bootstrapped with
step 1, 200 replications. Estimates in the second step are weighted by the number of employed
individuals at the municipality level. The specifications of the first and second steps are the same
as those reported in Table 2. Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 13: Effects of Trade-Induced Wage Gaps on the Skill Distribution: Two- and Three-
Year Lags
Step 2, skill definition 1 Mean SD Mean SD
Predicted w90/w50, two-year lag 6.298*** 3.454***
(0.332) (0.240)
Predicted w50/w10, two-year lag -1.084*** -0.594***
(0.063) (0.042)
N 1,666 1,666 1,666 1,666
Wald chi-sq 40144.561 28756.008 40144.561 28756.008
Step 2, skill definition 1 Mean SD Mean SD
Predicted w90/w50, three-year lag 6.780*** 3.751***
(0.325) (0.268)
Predicted w50/w10, three-year lag -1.167*** -0.645***
(0.064) (0.045)
N 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568
Wald chi-sq 39000.732 22756.128 39000.732 22756.128
Notes: Skill definition 1 is based on the whole systematic component of the two-way fixed effects
wage regression. The second step is estimated by using the system GMM estimator, and the stan-
dard errors are clustered at the municipality level and sequentially bootstrapped with step 1, 200
replications. Estimates in the second step are weighted by the number of employed individuals at
the municipality level. The specifications of the first and second steps are the same as those reported
in Table 2. Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 14: Effects of Trade Activity on the Wage Gap and Skill Distribution: The Case of
Portugal
Step 1 w90/w50 w50/w10
Export 0.036*** 0.020***
(0.004) (0.004)
F stat 256.5 256.5
N 1,126 1,126
R-sq 0.561 0.595
Step 2, skill definition 1 Mean SD Mean SD
Predicted w90/w50, first-year lag 0.165*** 0.023***
(0.024) (0.005)
Predicted w50/w10, first-year lag -0.297 -0.042***
(0.199) (0.010)
N 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218
Wald chi-sq 120345.876 100344.367 120345.876 100344.367
Notes: Skill definition 1 is based on the multidimensional index of workers’ human capital. In
the first step, export is instrumented with world import demand (see Equation 2), and standard
errors are clustered at the industry level. The first step includes the following control variables:
industry sales per employee, industry workforce composition characteristics, and year and 2-digit
industry dummies. The second step includes the lag of the dependent variable and the following
control variables averaged at the municipality level and lagged one period: sales per employee
average, workforce composition characteristics, and year and municipality dummies. The second
step is estimated by using the system GMM estimator, and the standard errors are clustered at
the municipality level and sequentially bootstrapped with step 1, 200 replications. Estimates in
the second step are weighted by the number of employed individuals at the municipality level.
Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
52
A Appendix: Theoretical Solutions
In this section, we present a general model of the skill upgrading decision. θ = 1 corresponds to a
frictionless environment, while 0 < θ < 1 corresponds to the frictional environment.
Since individuals can perfectly smooth their consumption over time, it is easy to show that their
lifetime utility, Vi, is an increasing function of their lifetime income, Wi ≡
∑3
t=1w(sit)pt(1− Iit e¯ai ).
Hence, we examine the following three cases.
Case 1: No skill upgrading: Iit = 0 for t = 1, 2, 3
The first case is if the individual decides not to obtain additional skills. Her lifetime income is:
W 1 = w(s)(p1 + p2 + p3) (7)
Case 2: Upgrade skills once: Ii1 = 1 and Iit = 0 for t = 2, 3
The second case is if the individual upgrades her skills once in her lifetime. Her lifetime income is:
W 2 = w(s)p1(1− e¯
ai
) + [θw(s+ e¯) + (1− θ)w(s)]p2 + [θw(s+ e¯) + (1− θ)w(s)]p3 (8)
Case 3: Upgrade skills twice: Iit = 1 for t = 1, 2 and Ii3 = 0
The third case is if the individual upgrades her skills twice in her lifetime. Her lifetime income is:
W 3 = w(s)p1(1− e¯
ai
) + [θw(s+ e¯) + (1− θ)w(s)]p2(1− e¯
ai
) + [θw(s+ 2e¯) + (1− θ)w(s+ e¯)]p3 (9)
We solve for the ability thresholds, A1 =
w(s)p1e¯
θ(p2+p3)∆1
and A2 =
[w(s)+θ∆1]p2e¯
p3[θ∆2+(1−θ)∆1] , such that when
an individual i’s ability ai ≤ A1, they have W 1 ≥ W 2, and when an individual i′s ai ≥ A2, the
individual has W 3 ≥W 2; when an individual i’s ability A1 ≤ ai ≤ A2, the individual has W 2 ≥W 3
and W 2 ≥W 1.
The effect of changes in ∆1 and ∆2 on the thresholds can be summarized as follows:
∂A1
∂∆1
= − w(s)p1e¯
θ(p2 + p3)∆21
< 0 (10)
∂A2
∂∆1
|∆2 =
p2e¯[θ
2∆2 − (1− θ)w(s)]
p3[θ∆2 + (1− θ)∆1]2 (11)
∂A2
∂∆2
|∆1 = −
θ[w(s) + θ∆1]p2e¯
p3[θ∆2 + (1− θ)∆1]2 < 0 (12)
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Moreover, changes in θ affecting the above differentials can be summarized as follows:
∂
(
∂A1
∂∆1
)
∂θ
=
w(s)p1e¯
θ2(p2 + p3)∆21
> 0 (13)
∂
(
∂A2
∂∆1
|∆2
)
∂θ
=
p2e¯[w(s)(2∆2 −∆1) + θw(s)(∆1 −∆2)]
p3[θ∆2 + (1− θ)∆1]3 (14)
∂
(
∂A2
∂∆2
|∆1
)
∂θ
= −p2e¯[w(s)∆1 + w(s)θ(∆1 −∆2) + 2θ∆
2
1]
p3[θ∆2 + (1− θ)∆1]3 < 0 (15)
Finally, assuming a uniform distribution of ability, the first two moments are computed using
the following expressions. Moreover, the movement of thresholds in response to changes in ∆s
affects these moments, and we provide the corresponding implications below.
(1) Mean (E(s)):
E(s) = s
A1 − a
a¯− a + (s+ e¯)
A2 −A1
a¯− a + (s+ 2e¯)
a¯−A2
a¯− a
= s+
2a¯−A1 −A2
a¯− a e¯
(2) Variance (V ar(s)):
V ar(s) =
∑
[si − E(s)]2
=
A1 − a
a¯− a (
2a¯−A1 −A2
a¯− a e¯)
2 +
A2 −A1
a¯− a (
a¯+ a−A1 −A2
a¯− a e¯)
2 +
a¯−A2
a¯− a (
2a−A1 −A2
a¯− a e¯)
2
=
e¯2
(a¯− a)3 {(A1 − a)(2a¯−A1 −A2)
2 + (A2 −A1)(a¯+ a−A1 −A2)2
+ (a¯−A2)(2a−A1 −A2)2}
=
e¯2
(a¯− a)3 {(A1 − a)(2a¯−A1 −A2)
2 + [a¯− a− (A1 − a)− (a¯−A2)](a¯+ a−A1 −A2)2
+ (a¯−A2)(2a−A1 −A2)2}
=
e¯2
(a¯− a)3 {(A1 − a)[(2a¯−A1 −A2)
2 − (a¯+ a−A1 −A2)2] + [a¯− a](a¯+ a−A1 −A2)2
+ (a¯−A2)[(2a−A1 −A2)2 − (a¯+ a−A1 −A2)2]}
=
e¯2
(a¯− a)2 {(A1 − a)(3a¯+ a− 2A1 − 2A2) + (a¯−A2)(2A1 + 2A2 − a¯− 3a)
+ (a¯+ a−A1 −A2)2}
=
e¯2
(a¯− a)2 {(A1 − a)(3a¯+ a− 2A1 − 2A2)− a¯a+ (A1 − a)
2 +A2(a¯+ a−A2)}
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A.1 Flexible Market (θ = 1)
Replacing θ = 1, ai ≤ w(s)p1e¯(p2+p3)[w(s+e¯)−w(s)] ≡ A1 and ai ≥
w(s+e¯)p2e¯
p3[w(s+2e¯)−w(s+e¯)] ≡ A2. Assuming
d2w
ds2
< 0 and positive inflation (i.e., p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p3), we have A1 < A2. Hence, we can draw Figure 3.
Figure 3: Ability Thresholds and the Skill Upgrading Decision
Note: The above illustration depicts the ability-specific thresholds and the associated ranking of wealth given
zero, one or two skill upgrades. This illustration highlights that those individuals whose ability is below A1
do not upgrade their skills, those above the A2 level of ability upgrade their skills twice in their lifetime, and
those in between A1 and A2 upgrade their skills only once.
∂A1
∂∆1
< 0 (16)
∂A2
∂∆1
|∆2 > 0 (17)
∂A2
∂∆2
|∆1 < 0 (18)
Implications for the Overall Skill Distribution:
• If | ∂A1∂∆1 | < | ∂A2∂∆1 |∆2 |, an increase in ∆1 decreases the mean (E(s)) and variation (V ar(s))
of skills. (1) Mean: When ∆1 increases, A1 decreases and A2 increases. Since | ∂A1∂∆1 | <
| ∂A2∂∆1 |∆2 |, the decrease in A1 is smaller than the increase in A2. Hence, E(s) = s+ 2a¯−A1−A2a¯−a e¯
decreases. (2) Variance: Since a¯ + a < 2A2, a¯ + a > 2A1, and a < A1 < A2 < a¯, we have
3a¯+ a− 2A1 − 2A2 > a¯+ a− 2A1 > 0. When ∆1 increases, A1 decreases and A2 increases.
Assuming that | ∂A1∂∆1 | < | ∂A2∂∆1 |∆2 |, we have that both (A1 − a) and (3a¯ + a − 2A1 − 2A2)
decrease. The last term in V ar(s) is A2(a¯ + a − A2). Its value changes by a¯ + a − 2A2 < 0
when A2 increases by 1. Hence, V ar(s) is A2(a¯+a−A2) and also decreases when A2 increases.
Therefore, we prove that V ar(s) decreases when ∆1 increases.
• An increase in ∆2 increases both the mean (E(s)) and the variation (V ar(s)) of skills.
(1) Mean: When ∆2 increases, A2 decreases while A1 does not change. Hence, E(s) =
s+ 2a¯−A1−A2a¯−a e¯ increases.
(2) Variance: When A2 decreases, we have that both 3a¯+ a− 2A1− 2A2 and A2(a¯+ a−A2)
increases. Therefore, we prove that V ar(s) increases when ∆2 increases.
55
A.2 Frictional Markets (0 < θ < 1)
Before proving the implications for the skill distribution of changes in ∆1 and ∆2, we first establish
the condition for θ under which A1 < A2. To have A1 < A2, we need Xθ
2 + Y θ + Z > 0, where
X = (p2 + p3)p2e¯∆
2
1 > 0 (19)
Y = e¯w(s)[(p2 + p3)p2∆1 + (∆1 −∆2)p1p3] > 0
Z = −e¯w(s)p1p3∆1 < 0
Given the quadratic nature of the equation Xθ2 + Y θ + Z, it is easy to see that the equation’s
lowest point is achieved at θ = −Y2X < 0. That is, for any 0 < θ ≤ 1, Xθ2 + Y θ + Z monotonically
increases along θ. Then, we solve for the positive θ∗ that equalizes Xθ2 + Y θ + Z to 0:
θ∗ =
−Y +√Y 2 − 4XZ
2X
> 0 (20)
where −4XZ > 0, and thus, Y 2 − 4XZ > Y 2 > 0. Hence, we have −Y+
√
Y 2−4XZ
2X > 0. Assuming
that d
2w
ds2
< 0 and positive inflation (i.e., p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p3), when θ = 1 in the baseline mode,l we have
A1 < A2, and thus, Xθ
2 + Y θ + Z > 0. Therefore, Xθ2 + Y θ + Z monotonically increases for the
positive θ ∈ [θ∗, 1].
We have proven that −Y+
√
Y 2−4XZ
2X < 1. Hence, we have shown that to have A1 < A2, we
need 0 < −Y+
√
Y 2−4XZ
2X = θ
∗ < θ ≤ 1, and this condition is consistent with θ being a probability
between 0 and 1.
Restricting θ ∈ [θ∗, 1], we can now study the distributional effects of changes in wage gaps.
Recall that we cannot assign a positive or negative value to ∂A2∂∆1 |∆2 unless we have additional
conditions stating whether θ is above or below some cutoff denoted by ¯ while restricting the cutoff
to lie in the range where A1 < A2, only, i.e., θ
∗ < ¯. To find θ = ¯, we need the numerator of
∂A2
∂∆1
|∆2 = 0, which implies that [θ2∆2 − (1− θ)w(s)] = 0. Solving for the quadratic equation in θ,
¯ =
−w(s)±
√
w2(s)+4∆2w(s)
2∆2
.
Then, for θ ∈ [θ∗, ¯], we have ∂A2∂∆1 |∆2 < 0, and for θ ∈ [¯, 1], we have ∂A2∂∆1 |∆2 > 0.
Implications for the Overall Skill Distribution:
• An increase in ∆1 has an ambiguous effect on E(s) and V ar(s). Depending on the relationship
between | ∂A1∂∆1 | and | ∂A2∂∆1 |∆2 | and the magnitude of θ, various cases are possible, and therefore,
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the ultimate effect is at best ambiguous.
Mean =

Decreases if | ∂A1∂∆1 | < | ∂A2∂∆1 |∆2 | & θ ∈ [¯, 1]
Increases if | ∂A1∂∆1 | > | ∂A2∂∆1 |∆2 | & θ ∈ [¯, 1]
Unchanged if | ∂A1∂∆1 | = | ∂A2∂∆1 |∆2 | & θ ∈ [¯, 1]
Increases if θ ∈ [θ∗, ¯]
V ariance =
Decreases if |
∂A1
∂∆1
| < | ∂A2∂∆1 |∆2 | & θ ∈ [¯, 1]
Ambiguous otherwise
• An increase in ∆2 increases both the E(s) and V ar(s) of skills but by a smaller magnitude
relative to the case when θ = 1. (1) Mean: When ∆2 increases, A2 decreases while A1 does
not change. Hence, E(s) = s+ 2a¯−A1−A2a¯−a e¯ increases. Moreover,
∂
(
∂A2
∂∆2
|∆1
)
∂θ < 0, meaning than
in absolute terms, the effect increases as θ increases.
(2) Variance: When A2 decreases, we have that both 3a¯ + a − 2A1 − 2A2 and A2(a¯ + a −
A2) increases. Therefore, we prove that V ar(s) increases when ∆2 increases. Moreover,
∂
(
∂A2
∂∆2
|∆1
)
∂θ < 0, meaning that in absolute terms, the effect increases as θ increases.
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